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T
his article examines the condition of U.S.
commercial banks of various sizes since the
early 1990s, with an emphasis on differences
between the condition of community banks and
larger banks. There is evidence that deterioration
in the condition of banks has adverse effects on
the pace of economic activity. One reason for exam-
ining the condition of banks of different size, rather
than the condition of the entire banking industry,
is that community banks account for a dispropor-
tionate share of bank loans to small businesses. In
addition, failures of community banks account for
a disproportionate share of losses to the deposit
insurance funds.
Despite the consolidation of the banking indus-
try in recent years, community banks continue to
constitute a relevant portion of the banking industry.
We identify community banks as those with less
than $1 billion in assets.1 As of the fourth quarter
of 2001, 85 percent of all banks had total assets less
than $1 billion. While community banks accounted
for about 15 percent of banking assets in the second
quarter of 2001, they held about 40 percent of the
number of business loans outstanding of less than
$1 million.2 Furthermore, there is evidence that the
failure of community banks can have adverse effects
on local economic activity.3 The condition of com-
munity banks is especially relevant for an assessment
of the risk of loss by the deposit insurance fund, since
bank failure rates and Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) loss rates on bank failures have
been inversely related to bank size (Shibut, 2001).
As the data presented in Tables 1 through 7 in
this article are quickly out of date, see the web site
of the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis for the most current data. In the past
the condition of banks has varied substantially
among regions of the United States (FDIC, 1997).
Although the tables in this article are not presented
by geographic region, the data appendix on the web
site includes current data on the measures of bank
condition in the nine U.S. Census divisions. 
WHY IS THE CONDITION OF THE
BANKING INDUSTRY IMPORTANT?
Before examining indicators of the condition
of the banking industry, we discuss the evidence
that this information  may be relevant for the perfor-
mance of the economy. Lown, Morgan, and Rohatgi
(2000) examine how changes in the credit standards
of banks have affected the growth of bank loans and
the pace of economic activity. Their evidence is based
on a survey of changes in the standards that rela-
tively large banks apply in their lending decisions.4
Lending standards include collateral requirements
and the minimum credit rating and maximum
leverage requirements of borrowers. Lown, Morgan,
and Rohatgi (2000) present evidence that changes
in the percentage of banks that report tightening
their credit standards for commercial and industrial
(C&I) lending affect the growth rate of bank lending
and some measures of economic activity. If deteri-
oration in the financial condition of banks induces
them to tighten their lending standards, then adverse
effects on the pace of economic activity could result.
However, this possible result cannot be inferred for
community banks because all of the banks included
4 The sample of banks for the Senior Loan Officers Opinion Survey on
Bank Lending Practices is selected from among the largest banks in
each Federal Reserve District. As of 2001, large banks are identified
as those with total domestic assets of $20 billion or more. 
1 It is common to identify community banks in terms of the amount
of their assets. For instance, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
identifies community financial institutions (banks and savings and
loan associations) as those with total assets of less than $500 million.
American Banker uses a definition of a community bank that includes
total assets of $1 billion; see p. 6 of the March 27, 2002, issue. In a
discussion of the condition of community banks, Governor Susan Bies
of the Federal Reserve Board refers to data for banks with total assets
less than $1 billion (Bies, 2002).
2 See Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) for a survey of the literature
on the effects of consolidation of the banking industry, including the
role of small banks in lending to small businesses.
3 See Gilbert and Kochin (1989). For a study that draws the opposite
conclusion from data for Texas, see Clair, O’Driscoll, and Yeats (1994).
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The period of the 1980s and early 1990s is espe-
cially important for an analysis of the effects of
bank condition on the performance of the economy.
Several hundred banks failed during these years,
and many of the banks were subject to close super-
vision during at least part of this period. Supervisors
usually require banks with substantial loan problems
to increase their capital ratios, and these banks
often attempt to increase their capital ratios by
reducing their assets (Peek and Rosengren, 1995b
and 1996; Curry et al., 1999).
Several studies report evidence of a credit
crunch in the 1980s and early 1990s. In a credit
crunch, large numbers of banks simultaneously
restrict their lending. An increase in problem loans
may induce banks to restrict their lending. Some
bank customers who are denied credit do not have
access to credit from alternative sources on terms
similar to those provided to them in the past. In a
credit crunch, the decline in the supply of bank loans
is large enough to reduce the pace of economic
activity. Studies in the credit crunch literature draw
different conclusions about the magnitude of the
effect of the credit crunch on the pace of economic
activity (Berger and Udell, 1994; Bernanke and Lown,
1991; Hancock, Laing, and Wilcox, 1995; and Peek
and Rosengren, 1995a). 
How relevant the evidence from the credit crunch
period is for other periods depends on what caused
banks to reduce the supply of credit. If banks reduced
lending because of the deterioration in their condi-
tion, we may conclude that a similar deterioration in
their condition in the future would induce a similar
restriction on bank lending. One of the charges by
bankers during that period, however, was that bank
supervisors had tightened standards for judging a
bank to be in satisfactory condition, forcing many
banks to reduce their lending. If that charge is cor-
rect, the evidence of the credit crunch period would
not be relevant for considering how a deterioration
in the condition of banks would affect the supply
of loans. Berger et al. (2001) recently reexamined
the credit crunch episode to determine whether
there was evidence of a tightening of supervisory
standards. They find evidence that the toughness
of supervisory standards for satisfactory banking
condition increased during the credit crunch period
(1989-92) and declined during the following boom
period in bank lending (1993-98). They conclude,
however, that these changes in supervisory stan-
dards had only small effects on bank lending. The
implication of Berger et al. (2001) is that the reduc-
tion in the supply of bank credit during the credit
crunch period reflected primarily the deterioration
in the condition of banks rather than a tightening
of supervisory standards.
The studies cited in this section do not attempt
to isolate the effects of the condition of community
banks on the pace of economic activity. Although
several of the studies of the credit crunch include
data for small banks (Bernanke and Lown, 1991;
Berger and Udell, 1994; and Berger, Kyle, and Scalise,
2001), the authors do not attempt to attribute the
effects on real economic activity to restrictions in
the supply of credit by small banks. An argument
that deterioration in the condition of community
banks has adverse effects on real economic activity
must be based on the role of community banks in
lending to small businesses, which tend to have
fewer borrowing options than larger businesses,
and the possible adverse effects of individual bank
failures on economic activity in the communities
where the failed banks had offices.
TRENDS IN THE CONDITION OF BANKS
Table 1 presents the number of banks in each
size group in each period. The largest changes over
time involve the banks in the smallest and largest
size groups. Since 1991 there has been a large reduc-
tion in the number of banks with total assets less
than $300 million, and the number of banks in the
largest group (total assets in excess of $20 billion)
more than doubled. These changes reflect consoli-
dation of the banking industry and internal growth
of banks, which, in many cases, moved banks into
the larger size groups.
Tables 2 through 7 present trends in the condi-
tion of banks in various size groups since 1991. Each
bank is assigned to one of the five size groups each
quarter based on its total assets that quarter. The
five size groups are not indexed over time for infla-
tion; the minimum and maximum asset size for the
banks in each group in these tables remain fixed
over time. One reason for using size groups fixed
in nominal dollars is that the banks with assets below
$300 million are subject to different reporting
requirements than larger banks.
Nonperforming Loans
Table 2 presents our first measure of problem
loans: the percentage of total loans that are non-
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that bank managers report as past due 90 days or
more or classify as nonaccrual. Banks stop accruing
interest due on loans as current income when they
classify the loans as nonaccrual.
Nonperforming loan ratios of community banks
(the first two columns of Table 2) increased modestly
during 2001. In contrast, the nonperforming loan
ratios of banks with total assets in excess of $10
billion began rising during the late 1990s and during
2001 rose substantially above the average nonper-
forming loan ratios of community banks. For banks
in each size group, however, nonperforming loan
ratios in recent quarters remain far below the
nonperforming loan ratios for banks of compara-
ble size during 1991, the last year of the 1990-91
recession.
Charge-Off of Loan Losses
The trend and level of loan charge-offs can also
help in the assessment of asset quality. A high level
of charge-offs, per se, does not indicate a weak port-
folio because the charged-off assets are no longer
on the books. However, recent charge-offs can be
informative about the assets that remain on the
books because the remaining assets may have been
originated under similar circumstances or at about
the same time. Table 3 presents the net charge-off
rate for total loans.
In interpreting the patterns in Table 3, it is impor-
tant to recognize seasonal patterns in charge-off
rates. Among the banks in each group with total
assets less than $10 billion, charge-off rates rose
from the third quarter to the fourth quarter in each
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Number of Banks by Asset Class and Date
Total assets of banks (millions of dollars)
Period Up to $300 $300 to $1,000 $1,000 to $10,000 $10,000 to $20,000 Over $20,000
1991 10,980 631 321 29 18
1992 10,525 635 324 30 19
1993 10,055 630 320 31 23
1994 9,558 637 326 31 26
1995 8,988 644 334 41 28
1996 8,536 658 331 41 31
1997 8,171 675 306 30 37
1998 7,797 692 309 24 41
1999:Q1 7,604 675 313 28 44
1999:Q2 7,549 684 311 29 47
1999:Q3 7,480 702 308 30 46
1999:Q4 7,401 737 309 29 46
2000:Q1 7,361 728 292 33 44
2000:Q2 7,309 736 291 36 44
2000:Q3 7,203 736 295 37 43
2000:Q4 7,118 748 307 35 45
2001:Q1 7,022 771 305 34 44
2001:Q2 6,947 786 306 30 47
2001:Q3 6,889 811 312 34 44
2001:Q4 6,798 835 312 31 47
NOTE: The number of banks in each size class by date includes all banks with total assets (call report item rcfd2170) greater than zero.
For annual observations, the number of banks equals the average number of the prior four quarters. Size class is determined on a
quarterly basis.
Table 1of the years 1999 through 2001. For the banks in
these size categories, therefore, it is more appropriate
to compare the charge-off rates in the fourth quarter
of 2001 with the rates in the fourth quarter of 2000
rather than compare them with the charge-off rates
in the third quarter of 2001.
Net charge-off rates rose slightly among com-
munity banks during 2001. The net charge-off rates
among banks with total assets above $1 billion, in
contrast, began to rise during the 1990s and have
risen during recent quarters to levels substantially
above those for community banks. Charge-off
rates among banks in each size group remain below
1991 levels. Although the weakness in the economy
has been accompanied by increasing net charge-offs
and asset quality recently has fallen only slightly,
the recent upward trend in charge-offs has not yet
reversed. 
One challenge in interpreting changes in net
charge-off rates over time is that these changes may
reflect to some extent changes over time in super-
visory standards. Supervisors have the authority to
influence the magnitude and timing of charge-offs
of loan losses by banks. Berger et al. (2001) find some
evidence of changes in supervisory standards over
time, but these changes in standards had only a
small effect on bank lending.
Problem Commercial and Industrial
Loans 
Losses on C&I loans are often important causes
of serious financial problems in banks. Tables 4 and
46 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2003
Gilbert and Sierra R EVIEW
Percentage of Total Loans That Are Nonperforming
Total assets of banks (millions of dollars)
Period Up to $300 $300 to $1,000 $1,000 to $10,000 $10,000 to $20,000 Over $20,000
1991 2.03 2.42 3.27 3.92 5.67
1992 1.63 1.92 2.55 3.13 4.80
1993 1.35 1.54 1.79 1.76 2.70
1994 1.07 1.05 1.12 1.32 1.61
1995 1.03 0.99 1.06 1.12 1.35
1996 1.00 0.96 1.14 1.00 1.01
1997 0.92 0.84 1.07 1.12 0.91
1998 0.94 0.80 1.03 1.10 0.94
1999:Q1 0.98 0.82 0.99 1.19 0.98
1999:Q2 0.95 0.75 0.88 1.28 0.93
1999:Q3 0.93 0.78 0.87 1.31 0.99
1999:Q4 0.82 0.72 0.82 1.16 1.00
2000:Q1 0.87 0.73 0.85 1.14 1.01
2000:Q2 0.86 0.71 0.82 1.17 1.05
2000:Q3 0.86 0.77 0.85 1.22 1.09
2000:Q4 0.85 0.77 0.90 1.31 1.24
2001:Q1 0.92 0.82 1.00 1.31 1.32
2001:Q2 0.98 0.86 1.02 1.28 1.40
2001:Q3 1.03 0.92 1.09 1.43 1.48
2001:Q4 1.01 0.91 1.03 1.35 1.62
NOTE: Percentage of nonperforming loans equals total nonperforming loans divided by total loans. Nonperforming loans are those
loans that bank managers classify as 90 days or more past due or nonaccrual in the call report. Precisely, total nonperforming loans
equals the sum of call report items rcfd1403 and rcfd1407. Total loans equals call report item number rcfd2122. When an annual number
alone is given, it is the mean of quarterly numbers. Bank size group is determined on a quarterly basis.
Table 25 present average nonperforming loan ratios and
net charge-off rates for C&I loans. Nonperforming
C&I loan ratios declined substantially during the
economic recovery after the 1990-91 recession
through 1997 for banks in each size group (Table 4).
Trends in the nonperforming C&I loan ratios of
community banks and larger banks diverged after
1997, rising among banks with total assets above
$1 billion but not among community banks. Non-
performing C&I loan ratios rose slightly during 2001
among banks with assets between $300 million and
$1 billion, but continued to decline among banks
in the smallest size group. During 2001, nonperform-
ing C&I loan ratios were lower among community
banks than among larger banks.
The quarterly pattern of net charge-off rates
on C&I loans (Table 5) indicates the tendency for
the banks in each size group to concentrate their
charge-offs in the fourth quarter of the year.
Although charge-off rates on C&I loans rose in recent
quarters among community banks, their charge-off
rates are substantially lower than those for larger
banks.
Coverage and Equity Ratios
The financial health of banks depends not only
on the magnitude of their problem loans (Tables 2
through 5), but also on the capacity of the banks to
absorb loan losses (Tables 6 and 7). Interpretation
of the patterns in Tables 6 and 7 requires informa-
tion about bank accounting practices for nonper-
forming loans and for loan losses. When a bank
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Percentage of Total Loans Charged Off as Losses
Total assets of banks (millions of dollars)
Period Up to $300 $300 to $1,000 $1,000 to $10,000 $10,000 to $20,000 Over $20,000
1991 1.14 1.52 2.04 1.93 2.28
1992 0.83 1.18 1.57 1.50 1.65
1993 0.54 0.72 0.93 1.01 1.09
1994 0.41 0.47 0.62 0.79 0.45
1995 0.42 0.53 0.91 0.82 0.39
1996 0.43 0.63 1.00 0.95 0.35
1997 0.41 0.50 1.22 1.27 0.52
1998 0.46 0.60 1.13 1.01 0.63
1999:Q1 0.22 0.38 0.83 0.96 0.57
1999:Q2 0.27 0.33 0.72 1.01 0.51
1999:Q3 0.28 0.33 0.68 1.16 0.57
1999:Q4 0.42 0.52 0.78 1.07 0.68
2000:Q1 0.19 0.39 0.64 0.98 0.54
2000:Q2 0.31 0.32 0.52 1.09 0.54
2000:Q3 0.29 0.36 0.61 1.17 0.57
2000:Q4 0.41 0.46 0.79 1.48 0.97
2001:Q1 0.20 0.30 0.67 1.44 0.73
2001:Q2 0.28 0.40 0.87 1.26 0.84
2001:Q3 0.34 0.39 0.89 1.52 1.09
2001:Q4 0.52 0.56 1.40 1.42 1.49
NOTE: Charge-offs are measured on a net basis—loans charged off as losses minus recoveries on loans previously charged off. The
percentage of loans charged off as losses each quarter (net of recoveries on loans previously charged off as losses) is calculated by
summing net charge-off for all banks in the size group and dividing by the sum of their total loans. Quarterly percentages are multiplied
by four to raise them to annual rates.
Table 3charges off a loan as a loss, it reduces its loans and
reduces an account called the “allowance for loan
and lease losses” by the amount of the loan that
was charged off as a loss. The bank increases the
dollar amount of its allowance for loan and lease
losses by incurring an expense called “provision for
loan and lease losses.” In other words, the allowance
for loan and lease losses represents the accumula-
tion of all provisions for loan and lease losses less
all charge-offs to the account. Since provisions are
expenses, increases in provisions reduce net income.
As with any expense, provisions for loan and lease
losses reduce a bank’s equity. 
Under the principles of bank accounting, loans
reported as nonperforming have not yet been
charged off as losses. When a bank charges a non-
performing loan off as a loss, it no longer reports
the loan as nonperforming. An increase in nonper-
forming loans increases the chances that a bank
will have larger charges against its allowance for
loan and lease losses in the future. Banks often
increase their allowances for loan and lease losses
through larger provisions when they anticipate
future losses on nonperforming loans.
A measure of the adequacy of a bank’s allowance
to absorb future loan losses is the ratio of the allow-
ance to the amount of nonperforming loans, com-
monly called the “coverage ratio.” An allowance
greater than nonperforming loans suggests that even
if all of a bank’s nonperforming loans were charged
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Percentage of Commercial Loans That Are Nonperforming
Total assets of banks (millions of dollars)
Period Up to $300 $300 to $1,000 $1,000 to $10,000 $10,000 to $20,000 Over $20,000
1991 4.17 3.18 3.74 4.34 5.34
1992 3.61 2.53 2.77 3.58 3.87
1993 2.83 1.89 1.74 1.79 2.10
1994 2.24 1.20 0.98 1.19 1.23
1995 2.07 1.10 0.98 0.98 1.19
1996 2.07 1.24 0.90 0.72 0.86
1997 1.95 1.12 0.83 0.61 0.73
1998 2.06 1.15 0.90 0.83 0.89
1999:Q1 2.27 1.16 1.01 0.97 1.00
1999:Q2 2.19 1.06 1.00 1.28 0.99
1999:Q3 2.13 1.20 1.07 1.14 1.15
1999:Q4 1.79 1.05 0.91 1.18 1.17
2000:Q1 1.92 1.09 1.04 1.21 1.27
2000:Q2 1.90 1.13 1.15 1.30 1.43
2000:Q3 1.91 1.22 1.23 1.35 1.57
2000:Q4 1.78 1.18 1.33 1.56 1.74
2001:Q1 1.40 1.31 1.53 1.64 1.95
2001:Q2 1.47 1.32 1.58 1.65 2.24
2001:Q3 1.54 1.40 1.72 1.90 2.39
2001:Q4 1.46 1.27 1.62 2.02 2.73
NOTE: Percentage of nonperforming commercial loans equals total nonperforming commercial loans divided by total commercial
loans. Nonperforming commercial loans are those commercial loans that bank managers classify as 90 days or more past due or non-
accrual in the call report. Precisely, nonperforming commercial loans equals the sum of call report items rcfd1252, rcfd1253, rcfd1255,
rcfd1256, rcon1223, rcon1224, rcon1607, and rcon1608. Total commercial loans equals call report item number rcfd1766. When an annual
number alone is given, it is the mean of the quarterly numbers. Bank size group is determined on a quarterly basis.
Table 4off as losses, its allowance would be adequate to
absorb the charge-offs. In addition, banks with cover-
age ratios above unity are less likely to need relatively
large provisions for loan and lease losses in the
future, to offset losses charged against their allow-
ance, than banks with coverage ratios below unity.
Table 6 shows the percentage of assets among
banks with coverage ratios of unity or higher. An
increase in this percentage bolsters the protection
of bank equity from charge-offs of nonperforming
loans. These percentages were relatively low in 1991
but increased rapidly in the following years. During
recent quarters, this percentage has declined for
banks in each size group, with the largest declines
among banks with assets in excess of $20 billion.
As recently as the third quarter of 2000, almost all
of the assets among these large banks were held by
banks with coverage ratios in excess of unity. The
average percentage for 2001, in contrast, was just
above 80 percent.
The coverage ratios for loan losses (shown in
Table 6) have also declined during recent quarters
among community banks, and this measure is lower
for community banks than for larger banks. This
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Percentage of Commercial Loans Charged Off as Losses
Total assets of banks (millions of dollars)
Period Up to $300 $300 to $1,000 $1,000 to $10,000 $10,000 to $20,000 Over $20,000
1991 3.13 2.53 2.59 1.97 2.57
1992 2.29 1.97 1.37 1.23 1.17
1993 1.52 0.86 0.90 0.77 0.53
1994 1.16 0.47 0.33 0.26 0.16
1995 1.14 0.70 0.22 0.36 0.26
1996 1.07 0.70 0.40 0.17 0.10
1997 1.05 0.64 0.26 0.41 0.29
1998 1.24 0.75 0.64 0.47 0.56
1999:Q1 0.46 0.31 0.30 0.39 0.46
1999:Q2 0.77 0.23 0.40 0.41 0.55
1999:Q3 0.62 0.36 0.68 0.47 0.60
1999:Q4 1.16 0.79 0.90 0.73 0.72
2000:Q1 0.30 0.31 0.41 0.40 0.55
2000:Q2 0.65 0.46 0.47 0.60 0.69
2000:Q3 0.63 0.44 0.83 0.62 0.69
2000:Q4 1.12 0.88 1.08 1.12 1.33
2001:Q1 0.35 0.36 0.60 0.95 0.99
2001:Q2 0.58 0.69 1.07 0.82 1.29
2001:Q3 0.66 0.81 1.06 1.00 1.59
2001:Q4 1.23 1.10 2.90 1.45 2.69
NOTE: Charge-offs are measured on a net basis—loans charged off as losses minus recoveries on loans previously charged off. The
percentage of loans charged off as losses each quarter (net of recoveries on loans previously charged off as losses) is calculated by
summing net commercial loan charge-offs for all banks in the size group and dividing by the sum of their total commercial loans.
Quarterly percentages are multiplied by four to raise them to annual rates.
Because of changes in the call report in 2001, the charge-off rate on commercial and industrial loans for banks with total assets below
$300 million for 2001 are not exactly comparable to those for previous years. Prior to 2001:Q1, the ratio displayed equals the charge-
off rate for commercial and industrial loans and “other loans.” The numbers in the column “Up to $300” should be comparable before
and after 2001:Q1, however, because in no time period did “other loans” of banks under $300 million exceed 3 percent of the sum of
commercial and industrial and “other loans.” The charge-off rate in 2001 is comparable for banks across size classes.
Table 5contrast implies that if the loss rate on nonperform-
ing loans were the same on average among the banks
in each size group, then the allowances for loan
losses would tend to be less adequate to absorb
losses (i.e., to avoid reductions in equity) among
community banks than among larger banks.
The capacity of banks to absorb losses also
depends on the amount of equity those banks hold.
Table 7 indicates that banks in each size group have
maintained relatively high ratios of equity to total
assets during recent quarters. As of the end of 2001,
the equity ratios for banks in each size group were at
or near their highest levels since 1991. The banking
system has substantial equity available to absorb
losses that banks may incur because of large and
unexpected decreases in asset quality.
Assessment of Patterns in Bank
Accounting Information
Overall, the accounting numbers in Tables 2
through 5 indicate that loan quality has diminished
during recent quarters, more so for larger banks than
for community banks. Community banks have main-
tained lower nonperforming loan and charge-off
ratios than larger banks, although they have slightly
smaller buffers to absorb loan losses than do larger
banks. Yet, the percentage of assets at community
banks with coverage ratios greater than unity is still
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Percentage of Assets at Banks Whose Allowance for Loans and Lease Losses Exceeds Their
Nonperforming Loans
Total assets of banks (millions of dollars)
Period Up to $300 $300 to $1,000 $1,000 to $10,000 $10,000 to $20,000 Over $20,000
1991 55.05 49.74 42.46 31.53 19.48
1992 66.57 64.02 66.07 55.85 34.39
1993 72.34 76.40 81.65 84.33 53.15
1994 77.86 86.16 93.04 91.41 97.80
1995 77.65 84.02 87.53 95.45 94.35
1996 75.87 81.90 89.21 92.10 98.86
1997 77.34 86.04 89.87 87.36 100.00
1998 76.62 86.34 88.40 85.49 97.71
1999:Q1 76.03 86.29 89.55 87.80 97.54
1999:Q2 76.51 86.41 90.59 91.00 98.19
1999:Q3 76.88 86.68 90.35 91.45 97.63
1999:Q4 78.83 88.56 90.50 93.78 96.93
2000:Q1 77.43 86.34 90.62 90.77 98.68
2000:Q2 77.74 87.25 88.19 93.88 98.76
2000:Q3 77.48 84.45 87.28 89.46 98.91
2000:Q4 78.32 84.42 84.16 92.66 92.14
2001:Q1 74.38 82.91 85.14 92.50 83.23
2001:Q2 73.29 81.53 85.15 88.05 79.30
2001:Q3 70.77 78.75 80.83 83.14 76.78
2001:Q4 71.68 78.89 82.83 89.05 82.18
NOTE: Each bank is classified by whether the ratio of its allowance for loan and lease losses to nonperforming loans is greater than
one. The allowance for loan and lease losses is the sum of call report items rcfd3123 and rcfd3128. Total nonperforming loans equals
the sum of call report items rcfd1403 and rcfd1407. For each size category, the sum of total assets held by banks where this ratio is
greater than one is divided by the sum of total assets held by banks in the class.
Table 6high relative to the early 1990s, indicating that com-
munity banks have more adequate buffers of allow-
ances for loan losses now than during that time.
Banks in each of the five size groups, on average,
currently have high ratios of equity to total assets
relative to those in the early 1990s—large enough
to absorb substantial losses. In sum, the analysis
based on Tables 2 through 7 suggests that bank
condition has weakened recently but is still good.
Whether the trend of diminishing loan quality con-
tinues to undermine the condition of banks hinges
in part upon the performance of the U.S. economy.
SIMULATION OF AN EARLY WARNING
MODEL
Each of the financial ratios in Tables 2 through
7 provides limited information about the condition
of banks, and some of the ratios provide conflicting
signals. For instance, Table 2 shows rising nonper-
forming loan ratios, whereas Table 7 shows rising
ratios of equity to total assets. Early warning models
provide a means of condensing several measures
of bank condition into an index number that weights
financial ratios by how much each measure con-
tributes to the prediction of a bank’s financial dis-
tress. We use the output from the SEER risk-rank
model as a means of condensing several measures
of bank condition into one signal.  
The Federal Reserve uses a system for bank
surveillance called the System for Estimating
Examination Ratings (SEER). One of the models
used in this surveillance system is called the SEER
risk-rank model. The SEER risk-rank model estimates
the probability, ranging from 0 to 100 percent, that
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Total Equity as a Percentage of Total Assets
Total assets of banks (millions of dollars)
Period Up to $300 $300 to $1,000 $1,000 to $10,000 $10,000 to $20,000 Over $20,000
1991 8.88 7.78 7.29 6.27 5.24
1992 9.22 8.31 8.13 7.41 6.66
1993 9.72 8.88 8.74 8.00 7.37
1994 9.66 9.08 8.55 8.49 6.91
1995 10.60 9.62 9.22 8.53 7.16
1996 10.57 9.81 9.44 8.30 8.10
1997 10.85 10.25 9.95 9.33 8.35
1998 10.89 9.97 10.59 10.23 8.27
1999:Q1 10.36 9.41 9.83 8.87 7.93
1999:Q2 10.32 9.39 9.76 8.32 7.97
1999:Q3 10.39 9.62 9.67 8.74 8.44
1999:Q4 10.30 9.65 9.79 8.48 8.76
2000:Q1 10.04 9.37 9.16 8.58 8.03
2000:Q2 10.28 9.43 8.94 9.32 8.10
2000:Q3 10.57 9.67 9.42 9.50 8.41
2000:Q4 10.86 10.04 9.62 9.58 8.44
2001:Q1 10.55 9.85 9.38 9.45 8.25
2001:Q2 10.68 9.94 9.65 10.18 8.27
2001:Q3 10.94 10.19 9.99 10.64 8.87
2001:Q4 10.82 10.21 10.30 11.13 9.32
NOTE: For banks in each size category, the sum of equity is divided by the sum of total assets. Equity equals call report item rcfd3210,
and total assets is derived from call report item rcfd3368.
Table 7a bank will fail within the next two years. The model
uses data from banks that failed during the period
from 1985 to 1991 to provide a statistical relation-
ship between bank failures and financial data. This
relationship is used to estimate a quarterly SEER
risk rank for each bank using current data from the
call report.5 The independent variables of the SEER
risk-rank model (which are described in Table 8)
capture credit risk, leverage risk, liquidity risk, and
size. Although the model’s parameters are derived
from data during the 1985 to 1991 period, the model
is validated annually and has been shown to perform
about as well as other surveillance models whose
parameters are reestimated each period (Gilbert,
Meyer, and Vaughan, 2002). For more details on the
SEER risk-rank model, see Cole, Cornyn, and Gunther
(1995). One can use early warning models to derive
measures of the performance of the banking indus-
try, as we do here (Gilbert, Meyer, and Vaughan,
2001). Since community banks have had different
risk profiles and higher failure rates in the past than
larger banks, we look at each group’s median SEER
risk rank separately.
Figure 1 plots the median failure probability for
two groups of banks: community banks (assets less
than $1billion) and large banks (assets greater than
or equal to $1 billion). The median failure probability
declined in the 1990s for both community banks and
large banks. During more recent years, the median
SEER risk rank of community banks has risen but
stands only about 4 basis points higher than that
of larger banks. The median SEER risk-rank level
of both groups is still far below the level during the
1990-91 recession. 
REACTIONS OF SUPERVISORS TO
LOAN QUALITY PROBLEMS
If the dollar amount of problem loans rises high
enough to threaten substantial losses relative to a
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5 The reader can find this description of the SEER risk-rank model and
how it’s used as a regulatory monitoring tool in the Federal Reserve
Commercial Bank Examination Manual.
What Are the SEER Failure-Prediction Variables?
This table lists the independent variables used in the SEER (System to Estimate Examination Ratings) risk-rank model.
The signs indicate the hypothesized relationship between each variable and the likelihood of failure in the next two
years. For example, the negative sign for the net-income (ROA) ratio indicates that an increase in earnings reduces
the likelihood of failure, all other things equal. We use the median of failure probabilities estimated by the SEER
risk-rank model as an index of the overall health of community banks and large banks.
Variable Effect on failure probability
Credit risk Loans past due 30-90 days/total assets +
Loans past due 90+ days/total assets +
Nonaccrual loans/total assets +
Other real estate owned (OREO)/total assets +
Residential real estate loans/total assets –
Commercial and industrial loans/total assets +
Leverage risk Tangible capital/total assets –
Net income/average assets (ROA) –
Liquidity risk Investment securities/total assets –
Large time deposits/total assets +
Control variable Natural log of total assets –
NOTE: + indicates that higher levels of the variable lead to higher probabilities of failure; – indicates the opposite.
Table adapted from Cole, Cornyn, and Gunther (1995).
Table 8bank’s loan loss reserves and equity, the supervisor
of the bank may downgrade its rating and impose
an enforcement action on the bank. Most enforce-
ment actions are agreements between banks in
unsatisfactory condition and their supervisors about
the actions that are necessary to restore the banks
to satisfactory condition.6
Supervisors identify the banks that warrant
enforcement actions through regularly scheduled
on-site examinations. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 requires
supervisors to examine each bank every 12 to 18
months. Supervisors assess six components of bank
condition during these on-site examinations—capital
protection (C), asset quality (A), management com-
petence (M), earnings strength (E), liquidity risk (L),
and sensitivity to market risk (S)—awarding a grade
of 1 (best) through 5 (worst) to each component.
Examiners then use these six scores to award a
composite CAMELS rating, also expressed on a 1
through 5 scale. Table 9 interprets each of the five
composite CAMELS ratings. Supervisors give CAMELS
composite scores of 1 or 2 to the banks they consider
to be in satisfactory condition, and they give CAMELS
composite scores of 3, 4, or 5 to unsatisfactory
banks. Supervisors monitor the unsatisfactory banks
closely and discipline them through enforcement
actions. Banks tend to respond to a CAMELS ratings
downgrade to unsatisfactory status and enforcement
actions by reducing the growth rates of their assets
and loans (Peek and Rosengren, 1995a,b and 1996;
and Curry et al., 1999).
The CAMELS rating of a bank at a given point
in time reflects the results of an examination con-
ducted sometime during the prior 18 months. Figure
2 indicates the extent to which examiners identified
problems during exams conducted each quarter
since 1991. For the line labeled “Community Banks,”
the denominator is the number of community banks
that entered the quarter rated as CAMELS 1 or 2
and were subject to examinations begun during
the quarter. The numerator is the number of these
banks that were rated as CAMELS 3, 4, or 5 on the
exams begun during the quarter. This line indicates
the rate at which the community banks initially rated
as being in satisfactory condition were downgraded
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6 Some enforcement actions are cease and desist orders of courts that
require bank management to cease actions that threaten the solvency
of the banks. See Gilbert and Vaughan (1998) for information about
enforcement actions. to unsatisfactory status during each quarter. The line
labeled “Large Banks” is calculated for comparable
changes in CAMELS ratings for the large banks exam-
ined each quarter. The quarterly downgrade rate for
community banks was about 9 percent in 1991 and
fell below 2 percent in the mid-1990s. Downgrade
rates for both community banks and large banks
rose temporarily to about 4 percent during some
quarters of 1998 through 2000. While the downgrade
rates for both groups of banks have been higher in
recent quarters than during the mid-1990s, the
current downgrade rates for both groups of banks
remain low relative to the rates of the early 1990s. 
ACCESS TO CURRENT DATA
The data in this article are updated quarterly.
To provide an on-going picture of the condition of
community banks, the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis will maintain on its web page the most current
data in each table in the data appendix to this article.
In addition, the web page will provide the data in
Tables 2 through 7 for the banks in each of the nine
census divisions with total assets below $10 billion.
In the past the deterioration in the condition of banks
was concentrated in a few states, and this tendency
for an uneven geographic concentration of distress
among banks is likely to prevail in the future.7
CONCLUSIONS
The condition of most community banks, iden-
tified as banks with total assets below $1 billion,
has remained sound through the recent recession.
There is some evidence, however, of a rise in prob-
lem loans among community banks as a group
during recent quarters. For instance, the percent-
age of total loans that were nonperforming began
to rise at community banks during 2001. In con-
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What Are CAMELS Composite Ratings?
“CAMELS”is an acronym for six components of bank condition—capital protection (C), asset quality (A), manage-
ment competence (M), earnings strength (E), liquidity risk (L), and sensitivity to market risk (S). Supervisors assign
a grade of 1 (best) through 5 (worst) to each component. They use these six component scores to award a CAMELS
composite rating, also expressed on a 1 through 5 scale. The following is a brief description of the individual CAMELS
composite ratings. Supervisors view a bank with a rating of 1 or 2 as being in satisfactory condition. When it is
downgraded to a 3 or worse, it is considered an unsatisfactory bank.
CAMELS 
composite rating  Description
Satisfactory 1 Financial institutions with a composite 1 rating are sound in every respect
and generally have individual component ratings of 1 or 2. 
2 Financial institutions with a composite 2 rating are fundamentally sound.
In general, a 2-rated institution will have no individual component ratings
weaker than 3. 
Unsatisfactory 3 Financial institutions with a composite 3 rating exhibit some degree of 
supervisory concern in one or more of the component areas. 
4 Financial institutions with a composite 4 rating generally exhibit unsafe and
unsound practices or conditions. They have serious financial or managerial
deficiencies that result in unsatisfactory performance. 
5 Financial institutions with a composite 5 rating generally exhibit extremely
unsafe and unsound practices or conditions. Institutions in this group 
pose a significant risk to the deposit insurance fund, and their failure 
is highly probable. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Commercial Bank Examination Manual.
Table 9
7 See FDIC (1997) for information on the geographic distribution of
bank failures during the 1980s and early 1990s.trast, the nonperforming loan ratio for banks with
assets above $1 billion began rising after 1997. The
condition of banks in each size group, however,
remains much stronger than during the recession
that ended in 1991. The rate of downgrades (see
Figure 2) suggests that examiners are not detecting
a systematic deterioration in the condition of com-
munity banks.
Several studies conclude that a deterioration in
the condition of banks can have adverse effects on
economic activity, and some of this evidence is rele-
vant for community banks. These studies of the
“credit crunch” focus on the late 1980s and early
1990s, however, and the present condition of the
banking industry in the United States remains much
stronger than it was during that time. The current
relatively strong condition of U.S. commercial banks
(both community banks and larger banks) suggests,
therefore, that the state of the banking industry is
not a hindrance to U.S. economic activity.
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